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of the opinion, the court approved the admission and use of
that evidence in the following language: "Appellant concedes .that People v. Hinkle, 64 Cal.App. 375 [221 P. 693],
has held that. it is permissible for an officer to testify that
certain exhibits were registers of bets. J.Ie attempts to differentiate this case from the one before us by calling attention to the fact that the defendant here was acquitted of
having received and held money for bets and of recording
bets. We fail to see how this fact alters the rule of evidence
which permitted the admission of the testimony of an expert.
We think the case of People v. Hinkle is controlling, and
that further discussion of the point is unnecessary."
People v. Derrick, supra, involves the violation of subdivisions 2, 3 and 4 of section 337a, where testimony of the
same character was held to be admissible. In a cigar box in
the room in which the defendant was carrying on the barber
business, papers were found on which were written figures
and names more or less unintelligible to persons inexperienced
in the methods of gambling. Two officers who had worked Oll
gambling details in the city of the arrest and had become
familiar with expressions, symbols and characters used by
bookmakers in recording bets on horse races, were permitted
to testify to the meaning of such symbols and characters.
The appellate court held that the characters constituted a
proper subject of expert testimony and sustained the admission of the testimony of the officers.
The ruling in these authorities appeals to us as most reasonable and logical, and we have no hesitancy in following
it and holding that the trial court here erred in striking out
the evidence as to the meaning of the letters and figures
found in Exhibit D and other exhibits admitted in evidence
in this action. Any language found in People v. Davis, supra,
in conflict with these views is disapproved.
[3] The question then arises whether this court may
consider this evidence for any purpose upon the present
appeal. As before noted appellant's sole ground in support
of his appeal is that the evidence is not sufficient to support
the judgment. The evidence in question was stricken out
by the court at the close of the trial and after the case had
been finally submitted by the court for its decision. No
'effort had been made during the trial by appellant to controvert .or impeach· this evidence or to show in any manner its
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inapplicability to the case against him. Whether under such
circumstances a reviewing court could consider such evidence
has never been passed upon by this court or any appellate
court of the state in any criminal case so far as our knowledge goes. In civil actions the rule is well established that
it is permissible for the reviewing court to consider evidence
erroneously stricken out by the court on motion of the appellant in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to
support the determination of the trial court. (Gray v. Southern Pacific 00., 23 Ca1.2d 632, 644 [145 P.2d 561].) Our
attention has not been called to any criminal case from any
court where the present question has been given consideration. As this evidence against the appellant was admitted
during the trial, the appellant was confronted with it after
its admission up to the final submission of the case, and as
we have seen he made no attempt to controvert it. Had the
trial court not made its erroneous order, the appellant would
have been in the same situation as he is now in, if we give
consideration to the stricken evidence in determining the
question as to whether there is evidentiary support of the
judgment. Under this condition of the record we think there
can be no legal objection to our giving this evidence the
same force and effect as though it had not been erroneously
stricken out by the court.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.

[Crim. No. 4498. In Bank. Apr. 26, 1944.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. FLORENCIO "FRANK"
ALCALDE, Appellant.
[1] Homicide-Evidence-Sufticiency-Oircumstantial Evidence.A conviction of first degree murder of a blond woman was susMcK. Dig. References: [1] Homicide, § 145(1); [2] Witnesses,
§ 207; [3] Homicide, § 108; [4] Criminal Law, § 433 (2) i [5]
Homicide, § 183; [6] Criminal Law, § 1384.
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tained by circumstantial evidence that defendant had told
fellow workmen that he was going with a "blond" and that
he would have to get rid of her; that on the day of the crime
the deceased told other persons that sha was going that night
with "Prank," a nickname which defendant had assumed; that
an automobile similar to one owned by defendunt was observed
parked near the scene of the crime; that hair and finger marks
identieal with those of the deceased were found in defendant's
car; that particles of blood were found on the coat which defendant was wearing that evening; and that on his apprehension he denied that he knew the deceased.
[2] Witnesses - Impeachment - Bias-Procuring or Suppressing
Evidence.-A witness who has testified to material matters may
be cross-examined as to Iris attempt to bribe other witnesses,
and it may be shown by other witnesses that he offered bribes
to obtain false testimony. The attempt to suborn witnesses, if
proved, is material in weighing the testimony of the one !;uilty
of the attempt.
[3a, 3b] Homicide - Evidence - Declarations of Deceased - To
Show Intent.-In a prosecution for murder, a declaration of
the decedent that she was going out with "Frank," which was
defendant's nickname, on the evening the crime was committed,
was admissible for the limited purpose of showing thedecedent's intent and that such intent was probably carried out,
where such declaration was made under circumstances which
could create no suspicion of untruth, and where the declaration and the logical inference to be drawn therefrom, namely,
that she was with defendant that night, were relevant to the
issue of defendant's guilt.
(4] Criminal Law-Evidence-Hearsay-Declarations of Intent.~
Declarations of an intent to do a certain act in the future are
not, strictly speaking, part of the tram,action, but more properly fall within Code Civ. Proc., § 1870, subd. 15, as one of
"Any other facts from which the facts in issue are presumed
or are logically inferable." To be admissible, such a declaration must tend to prove the declarant's intention at the time
it was made; it must have been made under circumstances
which naturally give verity to the utterance; and it must be
relevant to an issue in the case.
[5] Homicide-Instructions-Grades and Degrees of Offense.-It
is proper to refuse to give an instruction as to a lesser degree,
or as to an included lesser offense, if the evidence warrants
[2] See 27 Ca1.Jur. 125.
[4J Sec 8 Cal.Jur. 90; 20 Am.Jur. 491.
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only a verdict of first degree murder in the event that the
accused is guilty at all.
[6] Criminal Law _ Appeal- Harmless and Reversible ErrorJury_Communications with Judge.-In a prosecution for
murder, a communication by the jury with the trial judge out
of the presence of defendant and his counsel regarding the
question whether the jury might render a decision of life imprisonment and not eligible for parole, to which the judge
answered "No," did not constitute reversible error where, even
if such communication had been made in open court,· the
court could not have responded by any answer other than
"No" or its equivalent, namely, that the jury was to be guided
solely by the instructions already given.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Santa Clara County and from an order denying a new trial.
William F~ James, Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction affirmed.,'
Joseph P. Bullock for Appellant.
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, and 'JamesF~BrehL'
nan, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.: i
SHENK,J.-The defendant, Florencio "Frank" Alcalde,
was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced' to suffer
the penalty of death. His motion for anew trial was denied;
He appealed from the judgment and from an order denying
his motion for a new trial.
'
On Monday morning, November 23,1942, the body ofBernice Curtis was found in a plowed field adjacent to Alma
Road between Palo Alto and Mountain View in Santa Clara
County. Death had been caused by a basal fracture of the,
skull resulting from the application of some bluntinstrnment
or substance. The jaw also showed a fracture. The eyes
were blackened and the forehead lacerated. The position'of
the body was facedown, the head and hair were matied,wi:th
blood, the sod beneath was soaked with blood, the face lap'_
peared to have been pressed into the sod, and the head was
covered with clods of earth. Bloody handprints were. perceptible on the fence boards bordering Alma Road. Awoman's shoe, some "bobby" pins, a comb, and some wearing
apparel, including Bernice Curtis' black caracul fur coat,
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were found on the road near where the body lay. The mate
to the shoe was found on the highway several hundred feet
away. The circumstances under which the body was discovered indicated unmistakably that Bernice Curtis had been
killed, with premeditated design.
[1] The defendant's main contention is that the evidence
is insufficient to sustain the jury's conclusion that he was the
perpetrator of the crime. The evidence was in the main
circumstantial.
The deceased was a divorced woman of about thirty years
of age. She was described as a "blonde," her hair having
been bleached. About four months prior to her death she
had gone to San Francisco from Chicago to be with and to
assist her married sister and the latter's husband, who were
about to become parents. She stayed with them in their
home on Sacramento Street until after the event. She then
moved to a rooming house on San Jose Avenue where other
young women resided and with one of whom she shared a
room. She accepted employment at a cigar store located at
Powell and Market Streets in San Francisco.
The defendant worked as a welder at the shipyards of
the Western Pipe and Steel Company in South San Francisco. He was married and had been residing with his wife
and five-year-old daughter in the nearby town of San Bruno
on premises owned and also occupied by his father. About
November 9, 1942, because ofa misunderstanding with his
wife, he moved to a hotel in South San Francisco under the
assumed name of Frank Galarda.
It was in evidence that the defendant told other workers
at the shipyards that he had a "hot blonde" Who visited him
at his hotel room; that he frequently called her on the telephone; that he showed her picture to his fellow workmen;
that he never spoke of her by name, but that he used slang
and low expressions in his references to her. Other evidence
disclosed that the defendant called Bernice Curtis on the
telephone at her rooming house. On the 18th of November,
preceding Bernice Curtis' death, the defendant said to a
fellow worker that the "blonde" he was going with was the
type of girl who wanted to marry, that she didn't know he
was married, that he was going back to his wife, and he,
would "have to get rid of her some way by the week-end."
On the morning of Saturday, November 21st, to another fellow worker he showed a picture of a blonde woman and an..
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other picture of his wife and daughter. The witness took the
picture of the wife and baby from the defendant's hand say~
ing, "You mean to tell me you give up that baby for'this
girl? There doesn't seem to, be any class out of that," to
which the defendant replied: "I'll tellyou,Pop; I have Ii
date with her tonight. I am going to try to have her" commit an act of sex perversion on me "and get rid of her. "
On November 22d Bernice Curtis stated to two persons,
her brother-in-law and her roommate, that she was going to
dinner that night with "Frank." She spent a portion' of
the day riding horseback with one of the other young women
who lived at the rooming house on San J ose Avenue. Her riding
companion saw Bernice board a homeward bound streetcar
about 4 :30 in the afternoon. That evening at 6 :00 her room"
mate saw Bernice dressing, and it waS then that 'the hltter
expressed her intention of going out with Frank. The roommate left the house at 6 :15 while Bernice was still dressing;
Bernice's riding companion arrived home at 6 :45 at which
time she observed a green sedan in front of the house with
a man and woman in it, which was then driven away. The
witness testified that she believed that the woman in the car
was Bernice.
The defendant owned and drove a faded 1936 green Chevrolet sedan with a dent in the right front door. A green
Chevrolet sedan was observed parked near the scene of the'
crime by a bus driver who saw the black fur coat on the road
in the early morning of November 23d. ' He slowed down to
pick up the coat, but "straddled" it before the bus, 'coasting,
could come to a stop. He testified that a little farther up the
road, close to the fence, was a parked Chevrolet, "between a
'34 and '37, faded paint job, old paint,. sort of green colored,"
with its lights burning, its right front door open, but that
the car was unoccupied. He looked at his wrist watch, the
hands of which pointed to 12 :45, put the bus in gear and
drove on, leaving the coat, which was picked up shortly
thereafter by another motorist. The bus driver also testified
that he saw the car again about a week or ten days later
when it was parked at the rear of ' the sheriff's office in San
Jose. The car that he observed at the latter time was admittedly the defendant's car. An impression was made of a
tire mark found at the scene of the crime. It showed the
Bame kind of tire as that llSed by the defendant on his auto-
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mobile. The police officer who patrolled the alley to the rear
of the hotel in South San Francisco on the morning of November 23d testified that there was only one car there at
12 :20, a Chevrolet Coupe. He patrolled the alley the next
time at 2 :20, and then saw also parked in the alley a 1936
green Ohevrolet sedan with a flat front tire. He was able to
identify it as the defendant's car because on the early morn.
ing of the previous November 20th he saw the same car
parked in a restricted outlying district of South San Franeisco, when he flashed a light on the defendant and the deceased, whom he recognized later from a photograph, and
examined the defendant's operator's license. The period between 12 :45 and 2 :20 a. m. was ample time within which to
cover the distance between the scene of the crime and the
hotel in South San Francisco by automobile.
There was testimony that hair found on the ceiling of the
defendant's car was identical with the decedent's hair, SOme
of which was received in evidence. A fingerprint found on
the rear-view mirror was shown to be identical with the thumb
print of the decedent. A bit of dyed feather found at the
scene of the crime was identical with feathers in the defendant's hat. Particles of human blood were found on a coat
belonging to the defendant and which he was wearing on the
evening of November 22d. On the Monday or Tuesday following the night of the crime the defendant took his soiled
linen to a different laundry from that which he had been
in the habit of patronizing. The inside of the car was quite
damp indicating that it had been washed. Spots on the
upholstery reacted positively to the presumptive blood test.
There was a fracture on the right front side of the windshield
Of the defendant's car which a witness testified was not there
before the 23d of November, but which he observed for the
first time on the 24th. '

Upon his apprehension '~he defendant denied that he knew
Bernice Curtis, that he ever bought flowers or gaye flowers to
her, or that he ever took her out. On the trial he took the
stand in his own defense and there admitted that those state-,
ments were false. He testified that he met the deceased at a
pUblic dance in San Francisco about three weeks prior to
November 22, 1942; that he took her to other dances, drove
her about in his car, bought her corsages, and that on one
occasion she visited him at his hotel rOOm in South San Francisco. He claimed that the last time he saw her was on Sat-
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urday night, November 21st, when he drove her home from
a dance. He attempted to establish that ,on November 22d
he arrived at the hotel from work about 4 :30 in the afternoon
and parked his car in the alley ; that the cur was not ,again
removed until 6 :30 or 7 :00 the next mornirig. He testified
that he played rummy in a pool hall from about ,6 :3q unti~
9 :00 on Saturday evening with his father and two friends
whom he named; that he told his father he was going hack
to his wife; that he went to the car, discovered the tire was
flat, and telephoned his home; that there was no answer, so
he went back to his hotel room about 9 :30 and to bed; that
about 11 :30 that night he heard a friend coughirig, in the,
adjoining room, inquired the trouble, and received an answer.
His testimony in this respect was directly contradict,ed by
the men he hoped would corroborate him. They testified that
they did not see him after six 0 'clock on the everiirig .of the'
22d; that the conversation, about the cough did take phlCe
but that it occurred about nine 0 'clock on the morning of the
23d. The only witness who testified in support of the defen~
dant's asserted alibi was his father who stated that ,he left
his son at nine o'clock on the night of Nov~mber 22d, when
the defendant said to him, "Tell my wife I, come home .tomorrow." But the father was discredited by evidence that
he offered to pay two witnesses' 'good, and well" if they
would testify that the' defendant was in his hotel room at
9 :30 on the night of November 22d.
,
The defendant also testified that about 6:30 or, 7 :00 on
the morning of November 23d he changed the val~eon the
wheel carrying the :flat tire, put air in the tire, and went .to
his home in San Bruno where he washed the,car"altllough:,it;
was raining, andthat his wifebrushedollt th,e'interi0r~il'iIfI';l,)
admitted that he returned to the hotel aboutninEl. Q'cloc:\r.the"
same morning to get his clothes.
He stated'. :
thltt,
th~f~~et~t~'
,
"
,',';
I ,,','
in the windshield of his car occllrred in the previou~;.lp.6;ntP,;
oflJune. "To officers before the trial he said that)(Had.¥~p::
pened some time ago when he "slammed on" his,btaJi:es ,an~a '
girl he had with him struck, her head against the'jvindshield~
!Without recounting further details appeari#g 'in' the ,r,ec~ ",
ord it becomes apparent from the foregoing n:u~rative' that,
the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to connect the defendant with the commission of the cri~e and to establish
b~yond a reasonable doubt t~at he was the perpetrato~ thereof.,

i
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In People v. Nagy, 199 Cal. 235, 236 [248 P. 906J, it was
said: "Circumstantial evidence is legal evidence and may be
as conclusive in its convincing force as the testimony of direct
witnesses to the overt act. Circumstances very largely con.
trol the conduct of men in the most important affairs of life
and may be sufficient to justify a conviction of crime where
they are such as to exclude any other reasonable theory than
that of the guilt of the accused." That circumstantial evi.
dence may be as convincing in its force and as conclusive as
the testimony of witnesses to the overt act was reiterated in
People v. Latona, 2 Ca1.2d 714, 725 [43 P.2d 260], where it
was said: "The right to draw proper inferences from the
evidence is a function of the jury; and as long as its con.
clusions do not do violence to reason, an appellate court is
not permitted to substitute its finding of the ultimate fact
for that reached by the constitutional as well as the statutory
arbiter thereof."
The defendant relies on People v. Lamson, 1 Ca1.2d 648
[36 P.2d 361J, wherein the judgment of conviction was reo
versed. As stated heretofore that case decided nothing except
that the judgment be reversed.· (People v. Newland, 15 Cal.
2d 678, 681 [104 P.2d 778J.) In the Newland case it was
said: "If the circumstances reasonably justify the verdict
of the jury, the opinion of the reviewing court that those
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with the
innocence of the defendant will not warrant interference with
the determination of the jury," citing numerous cases.
In the present case the sufficiency of the evidence to prove
premeditated murder may not fairly be questioned. The rec.
ord otherwise is sufficient to support the conclusion of the
jury that the infel'ences to be drawn therefrom were consist.
ent with the defendant's guilt and inconsistent with any other
rational hypothesis.
[2] The defendant claims that prejudicial error resulted
from the trial court's ruling permitting the cross-examina_
tion by the prosecution of the defendant's father on the question of his alleged offer to pay two witnesses to testify, con ..
trary to the fact, that they saw the defendant in the hotel
at 9 :30 p. m. on November 22d. The ruling was not erroneous. A witness who has testified to material matters may be
cross-examined as to his attempt to bribe other witnesses and
it may be shown by other witnesses that he offered bribes
to obtain false testimony. The father testified to a material
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matter which, if true, would tend to establish the defendant's
alibi. The attempt to suborn witnesses, if proved,is material
in weighing the testimony of the one guilty of the aW~~npt.
(People v. Wong Chuey, 117 Cal. 624 [49 P. 833]; 27 Cal.
JUl'. p. 125.)
.
.... .•... <."
[3a] The defendant contends that prejudicial error was
committed by admitting in evidence over the defendant's
objection the declarations of the decedent made on November
22d that she was going out with "Frank" that evening. In
overruling the objection the court took the precaution to state
in the presence of the jury that the evidence was' admitted
for the limited purpose of showing the decedent's intention.
It is argued by the defendant that declarations not under
oath, made when the declarant is not confronted by the adverse party, are admissible to prove physicial orfuental' condition and only when either conditi()n is a matter in issue.
The. admission of such utterances, due precaution having been
taken by the court as here, is not so limited.
This is not a case such as People v. Wright, 167·CII.1.1 [138
P. 349], or People v. Thomas, 51 Cal.App. 731 [197 P. 677],
where the defendant was charged with homicide resulting
from criminal abortion and the physical condition of the decedent was a matter in issue. Nor is it a case such as Estate
of Snowball, 157 Cal. 301 [107 P. 598], or Bridge v. Ruggles,
202 Cal. 326 [260 P. 553], where the mental state of the
declarants was material on issues of duress and undue influence. In those cases the declarants' utterances were received
in evidence not to prove their truth, but to indicate the
mental condition of the declarants. (See, also, Adkins v.
Brett, 184 Cal. 252 [193 P. 251J ; Estate of Carson, 184 Cal.
437 [194 P. 5,17 A.L.R. 239].) In the present case the decedent's mental condition at the time of her declaration was
not an issue, and her utterance could not be offered as proof
thereof. Her utterance was hearsay. It was made' extrajudicially and offered as proof of the truth of its content. It
was a declaration of intent to do an act in the future, offered
as evidence that the deceased had the intent she declared and
that the intent was probably carried out, namely, that she
intended to and did go out that night with a man named
"Frank."
From the declared intent to do a particular thing an inference that the thing was done may fairly be drawn. Such
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declarations have been deemed admissible where they pos.
sessed a high degree of trustworthiness. Where they are relevant to an issue in the case and the declarant is dead or
otherwise unavailable the necessity for their admission has
been recognized. Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hillmon, 145
U.S. 285 [12 S.Ot. 909, 36 L.Ed. 706], appears to be the
leading case on the admissibility of declarations of intent to
do an act as proof that the act thereafter was accomplished.
The courts of this state have followed what is deemed to be
the weight of authority (see Wigmore, Evidence, 2d ed. 1923,
§ 1725; 19 CaI.L.Rev. 231 and 367; 35 Harv.L.Rev. 302, 444)
to the effect that declarations of present intent are admissible to prove a future act. In cases of homicide the admissibility of uncommunicated threats of the deceased against the
defendant has been upheld to show that the declarant was
the aggressor. (People v. Arnold, 15 Cal. 476; People v.
Scoggins, 37 Cal. 676; People v. Alivtre, 55 Cal. 263; People
v. Thomson 92 Cal. 506 [28 P. 589] ; People v. McGann, 194
Cal. 688 [230 P. 169]; People v. Spraic, 87 Cul.App. 724
[262 P. 795].) Declarations by the deceased of an intent to
commit suicide have been held admissible. (Rogers v. Manhattan Life Insurance Co., 138 Cal. 285 [71 P. 348]; Benjamin v. District G"and Lodge, 171 Cal. 260 [152 P. 731] ;
People v. Tugwell, 28 Cal.App. 348 [152 P. 740]; see, also,
Wilbur v. Emergency Hospital Assn., 27 Cal.App. 751 [151
P. 155].)
In If!tate of McNam~81 Cal. 82 [183 P. 552. 7 A.L.R.
313], mvolving the issue of paternity, a declaration of intention of the husband to leave his home and go to a distant
city was held admissible to show that the declarant actually
went where he said he was going. The court said, in reliance
on Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hillman, supra, that it was
well established that declarations of· intention were admissible uuder such circumstances. In Union Oil Co. v. Stewart.
158 Cal. 149 [110 P. 313, Ann.Cas. 1912A 5fi7], an action
to quiet title, a husband's declaration of intent to desert his
wife was admitted as bearing upon the fact of desertion.
In People v. Thomas, supra, a declaration of intent to go
to the defendant's office for an operation was admitted as
proof that the intention was carried out. Admissibility of a
declaration of intent to go to a certain place was upheld in
the case of eeople y-.,.!10ng Si!!:.2, 38 Cal.App. 253 [175 P.
911J, where the defendant sought to rely on his own lleclara-
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tion to establish an alibi. (See, also, People v~ Burke, 18
Cal.App. 72 [122 P. 435].)
. .
In other jurisdictions cases are ,found which recognize the
admissibility of declarations of intent to go to a certain place.
or with a certain person in the future. (Hunterv. State,
40 N.J.L. 495; State v. Hayward, 62 Minn. 474 [65 N.W.
63] ; State v. Mortensen, 26 Utah 312 [73 P. 562, 633].)
[4] In some of the cases the declaration of an intent to
do a certain act in the future has been admitted as a part
of the res gestae. But such declarations are not, strictly
speaking, part of the transaction. They are not encompassed
within section 1850 of the Code of Civil Procedure ... They
more properly fall within section 1870, subdivision 15, as one
of "Any other facts from which the facts in issue are pre,
sumed or are logically inferable." Greenleaf on Evidence,
vol. 1, 16th ed., § 162, points out that the existence of a person's design or plan to do a certain thing is relevant circumstantially to show that he did it, and may be evidenced by
his assertion of present intent when made in a natural way
and not under circumstances of suspicion; that the declaration is admissible not properly as part of the res gestae, but
merely as an exception to the general rule excluding hearsay evidence; that where such declarations have been excluded
it has usually been due to a misapplication of the res gestae
doctrine. Some courts have expressly rejected any necessity
for concluding that they were part of the res gestae. (Commonwealth v. Trefethen, 157 Mass. 180 [31 N.E. 961, 24
L.R.A. 235] ; State v. Mortensen, supra.)
No attempt need be made here to define or summarize all
the limitations or restrictions upon the admissibility of declarations of intent to do an act in the future or to indicate
what degree of unavailability or corroboration should exist
in every case. Elements essential to admissibility are that.
the declaration must tend to prove the declarant's intention
at the time it was made; it must have been made under circumstances which naturally give verity to the utterance; it
must be relevant to an issue in the case.. Those qualifications
are here present. [3b] The declaration of the decedent
made on November 22d that she was going out with Frank
that evening stated a present intention to do an act hi the
future. Certainly it was a natural utterancemad(!'under
circumstances which could create nosuspicion
of,'" unt~uth.. in.
.-,
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the statement of her intent. It did not necessarily refer to
the defendant as the person named. But the defendant was
called "Frank" as a nickname and he registered as Frank
at the hotel where he lived. The defendant admittedly had
been entertaining the decedent. Manifestly that fact, together
with other corroborating circumstances, bore directly on the
question, of the relevancy of the declaration. Unquestionably
the deceased's statement of her intent and the logical inference to be drawn therefrom, namely, that she was with the
defendant that night, were relevant to the issue of the guilt
of the defendant. But the declaration was not the only fact
from which an inference could be drawn that the deceased
was with the defendant that night. Other facts were in evidence from which the inference could reasonably be drawn.
The cumnlationof facts corroborative of the guilt of the defendant was sufficient to indicate that the triaJ court did not
err in admitting the declaration.
[5] The trial court refused to infltruct the jury at the defendant's request on the subjects of second degree murder
and manslaughter. The court submitted to the jury the al.
ternatives of finding the defendant guilty of first degree mur.'
der or of acquitting him,. The defendant assigns the refusal
to instruct as requested and the instruction given as prejudicial error.
Instructions are to be given with reference to the facts before the jury. The facts unquestionably pointed to a pre.
meditated homicide. No defense was offered by the defendant
except that of alibi. It is proper to refuse to give an instruc.
tion as to a lesser degree, or as to an included lesser offense,
if the evidence warrants only a verdict of first degree murder in the event the accused is guilty at all. (People v.
Watts, 198 Oal. 776, 793 [247 P. 884J; People v. Lapara,
181 Cal. 66, 73 [183 P. 545J.) There was therefore no error
in the refusal to give the requested instructions or in the
giving of the instruction complained of. Furthermore it appears from the record that the defendant had a full and fair
trial and that the jury was otherwise correctly instructed.
[6] During the deliberations of the jury a sheet of foolscap paper was delivered to the trial judge on which was written the question, with emphasized words as indicated, "May
we render a decision of life imprisonment and not eligible
for parole1" followed by the foreman's signature. The judge
returned the paper to the foreman with the notation thereon,
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"The answer is ' No'. " Prejudice is asserted because of this
communication between the judge and jury out of the presence of the defendant and his counsel.
It has been said that courts are practically unanimouS in
holding that private communications between court and jury
are improper, and that all communications shonId be made iIi
open court. (Dodge v. United States, 258 F. 300 [169 C.C.A.
316J.) Ordinary procedure would require that the trial judge
such
afford the parties an opportunity to be apprised of
communication and to have the opportunity to make, timely
objection to any action by the court or jury ,which might , be
deemed irregular. But in this instance the, coUrt' CQUld
have responded by any other answer than "No',' .or itS'equiv~:,
lent, namely, that the jury was to be guided solely by the in:- ,
structions already given. The answer of the ,trial' judge ' coUld
properly have been made over the objection of the' def~iidant
or his counsel if the ordinary procedure had 'been 'foilo~e(t'. '
The episode may not be deemed to be prejudicial, arid ',woUld
therefore not justify a reversal of the judgment o:r'o(the
order denying the motion for a new trial. . ' "', • ' , ':';
The judgment and the order are affirmed.'
"
" .'

any

not

Gibson, C. J., Curtis, J., Carter, J., alid Schauer, J;;tioncurred.
. ,
TRAYNOR, J., Dissenting.-It is my opinion that the trial'
court erred in admitting the testimony that the deceased said
on November 22d that she was going out with "Frank" that
evening. A declaration of intention is admissible to show
that the declarant did the intended act, if there are corroborating circumstances and if the declaralitis dead or unavailable and hence cannot be put on the witness stand. (See
McBaine, Admissibility in California of Declarations of Physicalor Mental Condition, 19 Cal.L.Rev. 231, 371, 378.) A
declaration as to what one person intended to do, however,
cannot safely be accepted as evidence of what another probably did. (See Maguire, The Hillmon Case-Thirty Three
Years After, 38 Harv.L.Rev. 709, 717, 719.) The declaration
of the deceased in this case that she was going out with Frank
is also a declaration that he was going out with her, and it
could not be admitted for the limited purpose of showing
that she went out with him at the time in question without
necessarily showing that he went with her. In the words of
'/
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Mr. Justice Cardozo, "Discrimination so subtle is a feat h~.
yond the compass of ordinary minds. The reverberating
clang of those accusatory words would drown all weaker
sounds. It is. for ordinary minds, and not for psychoanalysts, that our ru1es of evidence are framed." (Shepard v.
United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 [54 S.Ct. 22, 78 L.Ed. 196].)
Such a declaration could not be admitted without the risk
that the jury would conclude that it tended to prove the acts
of the defendant as well as of the declarant, and it is clear
that the prosecution used the declaration to that end. There
is no dispute as to the identity of the deceased or as to where
she was at the time of her death. Since the evidence is overwhelming as to who the deceased was and where she was
when she met her death, no legitimate purpose could be served
by admitting her declarations of what she intended to do on
the evening of November 22d. The only purpose that could
be served by admitting such declarations would be to induce
the belief that the defendant went out with the deceased,
took her to the scene of the crime and there murdered her.
Her declarations cannot be admitted for that purpose without setting aside the rule against hearsay.
The evidence in question was so damaging to the defendant
that it cannot reasonably be said that it probably had no
effect on the jury's verdict. (People v. Putnam, 20 Ca1.2d
885, 892, 893 [129 P.2d 367].)

IJ
iii

Edmonds, J., concurred
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Estate of ALFRED EASTER, Deceased. CALIFORNIA
TRUST COMPANY, as Administrator, etc.; Appellant,'
v. PAUL W. JONES, as Administrator, etc;, et aI., Respondents.
PAUL W. JONES, as Administrator, etc., Appellant, v.
SECURITY-FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF LOS AN~
GELES, as Trustee, et al., Respondents.
[1] Decedents' Estates-Final Distribution-Effect of DecreeConstruction by Resort to Will.-The effect of a will is controlled by the decree of distribution when final.
[2] ld.-Final Distribution-Effect of Decree-Estates Created.A decree of distribution providing that a trust shall terminate
on the widow's death and that the trust property "shall go to
and vest in" the testator's htirs at law in accordance with the
1020 statute of succession, distributes a contingent interest only
to the heirs, the contingency being their survivorship of the
widow upon whose death the trust terminates.
[3] Wills - Construction - Future Tense: Decedents' •:flstatesFinal Distribution-Effect of Decree-Construction.-Inasmuch as wills are made to take effect at a future time, it may
be proper to construe the future tense in a will as· applying
to the time of the testator's death, and not to a still later time.
A decree of distribution, on the other hand, normally speaks
as of its own date, for it is usually an order for the present
delivery of property, and the use of the future tense must ordinarily connote future action.

APPEALS from parts of a judgment of the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County decreeing distribution of an·
estate. Charles C. Montgomery, Judge pro tem. Affirmed.
B. R. Ware, Raymond W. Stephens and Stephens, Jones,
Inch & La Fever for Appellants.

Craig & Weller, Frank C. Weller and Thomas S. Tobin
for Respondents.
[1] See lIB Cal.Jur. 803; 21 Am.Jur. 653.
[2] See lIB Cal.Jur. 823.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Decedents' Estates, § 1059; [2] DecedClits' Estates, § 1052; [3] Wills, § 289; Decedents' Estates, § 1048.
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